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The European Union has the diplomatic resources, the credibility and the 
civil power to facilitate conflict resolution. These capabilities should now 
be utilized in the Middle East. The Middle East conference in Washington 
in November will provide a window of opportunity for peace-making, and 
in this context Europe can no longer hide behind the United States. 
 
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the pre-
dominant conflict in the Middle East for 
decades. Today there are an increasing 
number of crises, conflicts and wars in the 
region. Whereas it is true that the U.S. in-
tervention in Iraq put an end to Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship, it has led to the 
destabilization of the country and an out-
break of sectarian violence that threatens 
to spread throughout the region and has 
displaced millions of Iraqis. Iran’s regional 
ambitions have increased now that its 
former rival Iraq has been weakened, and 
its nuclear ambitions are a cause for con-
cern in Israel, in the Arab countries of the 
Middle East and the Gulf, and throughout 
the international community. The situation 
in Lebanon has become more tense both in 
domestic and regional terms as a result of 
the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 
the summer of 2006. Bearing all this in 
mind, it is clear that the resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict would not only de-
escalate the security situation between Is-
rael, the Palestinians and their 
neighbours, but would also have a positive 
impact on the region as a whole. 
 
Thus Europe should play a more promi-
nent role. There is an urgent need for a 
third party committed to the negotiations 
and, in a medium-term perspective, to the 
implementation of a peace agreement be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbours. It is 
doubtful whether the U.S. would be able to 
assume such a role, or indeed whether it 
has sufficient resources. Despite plans for 
a stage-by-stage withdrawal, substantial 
U.S. resources will be tied down in Iraq for 
months and years to come. From a strate-
gic point of view the U.S. is even more 
concerned about what will happen in Iran. 
At the same time, doubts have been voiced 
about the stabilization of Iraq, and the  
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reputation of the U.S. in the region is at a 
low ebb. With the threat of heightened 
tension and criticism about its activities in 
the region, the Bush administration would 
certainly like to see positive signals ema-
nating from the Middle East. President 
Bush has demonstrated his commitment to 
finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by convening a Middle East con-
ference in Washington in November 2007. 
In the run-up to the conference the Euro-
pean Union should lend support to its 
transatlantic partners in order to ensure 
that it turns out to be a success. Here the 
EU needs to do two things: 
 
•  First, it should try to convince its trans-
atlantic partners to adopt a regional ap-
proach to conflict resolution, and to in-
clude the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-
Syrian conflicts. 
 
•  Second, the European Union should de-
velop a common approach on how to inte-
grate Islamist movements in general and 
Hamas in particular, and should try to 
persuade the U.S. to put this issue on the 
conference agenda. 
 
The regional approach and the integration 
of Hamas are of crucial importance for the 
success of the conference. 
 
I 
Europe’s Changing Role 
The European Union has for many years 
supported the peace process between Is-
rael and its Arab neighbours. Until the late 
1990s its role was limited and hardly ven-
tured beyond the occasional declaration. 
However, as European Foreign, Security 
and Defence Policy began to make some 
progress in terms of institutionalized 
structures at the turn of the millennium, 
the EU’s involvement in the Middle East 
peace process slowly but surely began to 
gather momentum. Javier Solana, the EU’s 
High Representative for Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, has made the Arab-Israeli con-
flict one of his priorities. The European 
Union is an accepted and active member of 
the Middle East Quartet, which also in-
cludes the United Nations, the U.S. and 
Russia. Furthermore, it is a significant and 
visible economic actor on the ground. Thus 
the EU and its member states are the most 
important donors of financial assistance to 
the Palestinians. Until the Hamas coup in 
June 2007, European customs officers sec-
onded to the Palestinian territories helped 
to supervise the movement of goods pass-
ing through the Rafah crossing point be-
tween Gaza and Egypt, and stay in the 
area despite the borders being closed. 
European Blue Helmets form the largest 
detachment of the UNIFIL force which was 
deployed to secure the border between Is-
rael and Lebanon and to monitor the 
ceasefire after the 2006 war. 
“Integration of Hamas is 
of crucial importance” 
Since the beginning of 2007 (and after a 
period of stalemate) there have been some 
positive developments within the Middle 
East Quartet. In April 2002 the EU initi-
ated the Quartet under the Spanish EU 
Presidency, and also played a major role in 
its revival. Early in 2007, at the very be-
ginning of the German EU Presidency, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel travelled to the 
U.S. in order to persuade President Bush 
to revive the Quartet and its central docu-
ment, the Road Map. The Quartet met for 
consultations for the first time in five 
months at the beginning of February 2007. 
There was a second meeting in Berlin at 
the end of the month and another one at 
the end of May. At the same time the 
European Union devoted its energies to 
securing the support of those Arab states 
which are willing to co-operate on the ba-
sis of the Arab Peace Initiative. Since the 
situation had deteriorated in the aftermath 
of the war in Lebanon in 2006, with a 
weakened Israeli Prime Minister and the 
intra-Palestinian conflict, the European 
Union under the German Presidency be-
lieved that it would be a more promising 
strategy to try to encourage the moderate 
Arab states to play a constructive role. An  
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attempt to restart the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations would have been doomed to 
failure, and by turning to the Arab states 
the Europeans confirmed their regional 
approach to peace. 
 
The appointment of former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair as Representative of 
the Middle East Quartet in June 2007 
means that a high-profile European 
politician with strong ties to the U.S. 
administration has been given a 
mandate in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Even though Blair’s brief is 
limited to strengthening the Palestin-
ian economy, institution-building, 
and promoting the rule of law, his 
insight, experience and personal mo-
tivation suggest that he will also play 
a political role. If the other European 
members of the Quartet–the EU 
“troika” consists of the Commis-
sioner for External Relations, the 
High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and the 
Foreign Minister of the acting EU 
Presidency–are willing to co-operate 
with Blair and his team, and Blair, on 
the other hand, is willing to play the 
European card, it will strengthen the 
European position in the Quartet and 
enable the EU to play a greater po-
litical and far more visible role in the 
coming months. 
 
Nevertheless, the EU could make 
even more use of its diplomatic re-
sources in order to bring the conflict-
ing parties back to the negotiating 
table. The EU itself has to reconcile 
the interests of 27 member states with 
their different backgrounds on a daily ba-
sis. Its distinctive way of doing this means 
that it can be a skilful and credible partner 
in the Middle East peace process. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict can only be resolved 
by mediation, negotiations, and capacity 
building, and not by military intervention. 
Whereas the outcome is not in doubt, there 
is still the question of how it might be 
possible to organize the requisite level of 
support in the context of this multi-layered 
dispute. At the very heart of the process is 
the establishment of a viable Palestinian 
state that is able to meet the needs of its 
citizens, and to live in peace with its 
neighbour, Israel. On a number of occa-
sions in the recent past the European Un-
ion has demonstrated greater effectiveness 
with regard to mediation and state-
building. Enlargement was a very success-
ful instrument which supported the trans-
formation processes in the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc. A major part of the ac-
cession process was devoted to strength-
ening democratic institutions, bureaucratic 
structures, and the rule of law. The Euro-
pean Union does not possess large military 
capabilities, but it does have experience 
with state-building. For this reason it 
should continue to support capacity build-
ing in the Palestinian administration and 
judiciary. This also implies an open ex- 
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amination of Fatah’s failures in the past. A 
viable Palestinian state cannot be created 
merely by establishing government struc-
tures and procedures. It also needs politi-
cians who are willing to operate within 
this framework. And without a simultane-
ous political and regional solution, Pales-
tinian state-building will once again have 
been in vain.  
 
II 
Resolving the  
Conflict Now 
The Middle East conflict can be solved. 
Agreement has already been reached on 
the negotiated outcome, which is part of 
the Road Map – “land for peace”, a two-
state solution with a sovereign Palestinian 
state that acknowledges Israel’s existence 
and security requirements. Since its adop-
tion in 2003 the Road Map has been the 
point of reference for all the proposals 
made in the 
peace proc-
ess. Ev
though
has not yet 
been im-
plemented, 
and has 
even been 
declared to 
be defunct 
by some of 
its critics, 
it remains 
the only 
document 
to which al
the parties 
have given 
their as-
sent, and 
for this rea-
son should 
not be dismi
with the Arab “counterpart” of the Road 
Map, the Beirut Declaration (or 
en
 it 
l 
ssed out of hand. Together 
t first sight the prospects for the two-
 
Arab Peace 
Initiative) adopted in 2002 and restated in 
2007, it provides common ground for Is-
rael, the Palestinians and their Arab 
neighbours from which to embark on the 
implementation of the two-state solution. 
 
A
state solution look rather bleak at the mo-
ment. Both parties seem too weak to nego-
tiate peace. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert is under domestic pressure as a re-
sult of the war in southern Lebanon in 
2006. The Palestinians are divided, and 
President Mahmoud Abbas has always 
been politically weak. After several 
months of intra-Palestinian confrontation 
between Hamas and Fatah after the victory 
of Hamas in the 2006 elections, the sei-
zure of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the 
de facto separation of the Palestinian terri-
tories have added another layer to the con-
flict. However, although the current situa-
tion seems desperate, it is in fact condu-
cive to a resumption of the negotiations. 
Forging ahead with the two-state solution 
now might well be a domestic survival 
strategy for both Abbas and Olmert. For 
the sake of its security, Israel needs to do 
everything in its power to prevent a fur-
ther radicalization of the Palestinian camp.  
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A return to the negotiating table would 
seem to be a rational choice for both par-
ties. For the first time for many years the 
international community is jointly commit-
ted to resolving the conflict. Arab 
neighbours are showing a willingness to 
co-operate with Israel and the West. Saudi 
Arabia, a crucial player in the region, will 
probably be invited to take part in the 
Washington conference. The creation of an 
enduring peace in the Middle East is thus 
a distinct possibility. 
 
W
the implementation of the two-state solu-
tion may turn out to be an even more chal-
lenging part of the process, especially in 
view of the split between the Palestinian 
territories. This process needs to be sup-
ported and monitored on a regular basis 
by a third party. In the past there was no 
ongoing support from the Quartet for the 
implementation of the Road Map. It did not 
 
sraeli-Syrian reconcilia-
tion is crucial” 
respond to the Arab Peace 
tiative and failed to encourage the Arab 
states to become more active partners in 
the peace process. A lasting peace will 
only emerge if Arab countries in the re-
gion support it and develop a feeling that 
it is also their responsibility. This implies 
that what is now needed is conflict resolu-
tion, and not conflict management. A 
“step-by-step approach” which defers as-
pects of the problem (the status of Jerusa-
lem, the return of the refugees) to a later 
date would give radical groups an oppor-
tunity to torpedo the peace process. In the 
eyes of many people in the Middle East, 
the Oslo process was a failure precisely on 
account of its timidity. Another solution of 
this kind would thus be unacceptable, and 
on this basis governments would find it 
difficult to gain the support of their elec-
torates. 
 
 
III 
A Regional Approach and 
However, an enduring 
  First, the European Union should ad-
  Secondly, the EU should adopt a new 
the Integration of Hamas 
peace between Is-
rael and the Palestinians cannot be at-
tained without taking into account the re-
gional dimensions of the conflict, that is, 
the Israeli-Lebanese and the Israeli-Syrian 
disputes, and without intra-Palestinian 
reconciliation. Both are crucial for the suc-
cess of the peace process, and ought to be 
discussed at the Washington Middle East 
conference. In these two areas the Euro-
pean Union should play a greater role in 
shaping the agenda. 
 
•
dress the regional dimension of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The most serious 
problem facing this package deal approach 
will be the participation of Syria. The U.S. 
administration must be persuaded to in-
vite Syria to attend the Washington con-
ference, and Syria will have to be per-
suaded to accept the invitation. Israel is 
probably a less problematical factor, for 
there have been signs of a rapprochement 
between Jerusalem and Damascus. How-
ever, this has been accompanied by inci-
dents such as the recent violation of Syr-
ian airspace by Israel. These demonstrate 
that Israeli-Syrian relations are still highly 
volatile. However, with regard to the na-
ture of the dispute, it would be far easier 
to deal with the Israeli-Syrian conflict than 
with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
Europeans should point out to Israel, Syria 
and the U.S. that peace would be beneficial 
for all sides. It would reduce the risk of 
war and give Syria the opportunity to be-
come a regional partner for Israel and the 
West. 
 
•
policy on how to incorporate Hamas into 
the settlement of the conflict. If the Euro-
pean Union adheres to its practice of treat-
ing President Abbas and the government 
of Salam Fayyad as the only legitimate  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
A
 
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
T
a
k
e
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
 
6
 
ng a consensus within the 
uropean Union on how to en-
which it has continued to pursue. A per-
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
6
 
representatives of the Palestinian cause 
and continues to exclude Hamas, it will 
run the risk of cementing the division of 
the Palestinian territories, of aggravating 
the humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza 
Strip, and ultimately of failing to reach the 
two-state solution. If Hamas continues to 
feel marginalized, it might choose to ob-
struct any attempt to re-negotiate Palestin-
ian statehood. For the moment Hamas 
seems willing to be co-operative. In order 
to re-unite the Palestinian territories and 
to establish a functioning Palestinian 
state, a major challenge will be to foster 
the process of reconciliation between Fa-
tah and Hamas. The European 
Union should continue to encour-
age the moderate Arab states and 
Turkey to establish a dialogue 
between Fatah and Hamas. At the 
same time the EU should work 
towards the swift implementation 
of the two-state solution, which 
should happen as soon as possi-
ble after the end of the Washing-
ton conference. If a Palestinian 
state were to be established, at 
first only on the West Bank, it 
might have a positive influence 
on both Hamas and the Gaza 
Strip. Hamas can hardly object to 
the birth of a Palestinian state, 
and will probably try to be co-
operative in order to avoid losing 
ground in its intra-Palestinian 
power struggle with Fatah. 
 
Achievi
E
gage Hamas and Syria will be dif-
ficult. But it will be even more 
difficult to obtain the support of 
the U.S. administration. In its 
war on terror Washington has 
adopted a specific approach to 
radical Islamist groups such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah, or to the Sy
gime, which it believes to be part of the 
“axis of evil.” This rhetoric has prevented 
a dialogue with moderate Islamist groups, 
which are represented in parliaments in 
the Middle East. The European Union 
should adopt a more differentiated ap-
proach to Islamism in the Middle East. 
This means that it will have to demon-
strate leadership and an ability to disagree 
with its transatlantic partners concerning 
the ways and the means of reaching a 
shared objective. In the past European 
unity has tended to crumble under the 
pressure of what was deemed to be a 
“transatlantic choice.” This was particu-
larly apparent in the divisions caused by 
the war in Iraq. In the meantime the Euro-
pean Union has become more sophisti-
cated, especially in its negotiations with 
Iran on the latter’s nuclear programme, 
suasive European argument in favour of 
contacts with Hamas and Syria could be 
the impact that this might have on the re-
gion as a whole. Settling the dispute be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbours will 
rian re- 
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defuse the tense situation in Lebanon and 
offer Damascus an alternative to co-
operating with Tehran. 
 
IV 
The U.S. 
Middle East Conference  
The Middle 
  Putting the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-
  Specific steps leading to the implemen-
  Mechanisms designed to make imple-
  Keeping the moderate Arab countries on 
East conference convened by 
President Bush for the autumn of 2007 
constitutes an opportunity for peace. In 
the weeks ahead the European Union 
should play an active part in the prepara-
tions for the conference, and should de-
velop a common European position on the 
following issues: 
 
•
Syrian conflicts on the conference agenda 
(and persuading the U.S. to invite Syria to 
Washington); 
 
•
tation of the two-state solution at the ear-
liest opportunity (starting with a provi-
sional Palestinian state on the West Bank, 
but taking care to prevent a deeper rift be-
tween it and the Gaza Strip); 
 
•
mentation work; 
 
•
board (by discussing in detail how the vi-
sion of the Arab peace initiative can be 
implemented); 
 
•  Asking the moderate Arab states and 
Turkey to support intra-Palestinian recon-
ciliation by integrating Hamas; 
 
•  Supporting Tony Blair and his team with 
regard to state building and restructuring 
the Palestinian economy; 
 
•  Continuing aid programmes to prevent a 
severe humanitarian disaster in the Gaza 
Strip; 
 
•  Differentiating between radical and 
moderate Islamist groups in the Middle 
East and starting a dialogue with the lat-
ter. 
 
This agenda should be presented as a 
European contribution to a meeting of the 
Middle East Quartet Principals and their 
e n v o y ,  T o n y  B l a i r .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  
European Union and its member states 
should work to maintain the commitment 
of the moderate Arab states to the peace 
process, and to obtain the support of Syria. 
 
In order to come up with a sustainable 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the U.S. 
conference needs a thoughtful agenda, on-
going communication with all the parties 
involved, and a commitment from a third 
party that it will monitor the implementa-
tion process for a considerable period of 
time after the end of the Washington con-
ference in 2007. This is certainly an op-
portunity to broker a peace settlement in 
the region, but there is also the risk that 
the whole process will simply prove to be 
yet another failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
A
 
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
T
a
k
e
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 
 
 
p
a
g
e
 
8
 
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
6
 
Further Reading: 
 
Almut Möller and Christian-Peter Hanelt: Tony Blair Needs a Plan. Suggestions for the Working 
Agenda of the New Representative of the Middle East Quartet, CAP Aktuell N° 10, July 2007. 
 
Alvaro de Soto, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process: End of Mission 
Report, May 2007. 
 
House of Commons, Foreign Affair’s Committee: Global Security: The Middle East. Eighths Report of 
Session 2006-07, August 2007. 
 
International Crisis Group: After Gaza. Middle East Report N°68, 2 August 2007. 
 
Muriel Asseburg (Hrsg.): Regionale (Neu-)Ordnung im Nahen und Mittleren Osten und die Rolle 
externer Akteure, SWP-Studie, März 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responsible 
 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl Bertelsmann Straße 256 
D-33311 Gütersloh 
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
 
dominik.hierlemann@bertelsmann.de 
Phone +49 5241 81 81537 
 
joachim.vannahme@bertelsmann.de
Phone +49 5241 81 81 421 
 
 
Center for Applied Policy Research 
Maria-Theresia-Straße 21 
D-81675 Munich 
www.cap.lmu.de
 
matthias.chardon@lrz.uni-muenchen.de 
Phone +49 89 2180 1334 
 
sarah.seeger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Phone + 49 89 2180 1375 
 
 
ISSN 1865-7451 
Latest editions: 
 
spotlight europe # 2007/05 
Testcase Energy 
Stefani Weiss 
 
spotlight europe # 2007/04 
More Political Leadership is Worth the Risk 
Dominik Hierlemann, Armando Garcia Schmidt 
 
spotlight europe # 2007/03 
Who wants what and why? 
FAQs about the EU Constitutional Summit 
Dominik Hierlemann, Sarah Seeger 
 
spotlight europe # 2007/02 
Withdrawal or Creation of a New Union –  
A Way Out of the EU’s Constitutional Dilemma? 
Janis A. Emmanouilidis 
 